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Abstract: I present an internal problem for David Lewis’s genuine modal realism. My aim is
to show that his analysis of modality is inconsistent with his metaphysics. I consider several
ways of modifying the Lewisian analysis of modality, but argue that none are successful. I
argue that the problem also affects theories related to genuine modal realism, including the
stage theory of persistence and modal ctionalism.
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1 Introduction
David Lewis’s modal realism (1968; 1971; 1986) has been hugely inuential in
the philosophy of modality. It is known to suffer from the advanced modalizing
problem (Divers 1999), wherein commitments of Lewis’s metaphysics of possible
worlds conict with the content assigned to certain statements of possibility. (I
outline the problem in section 2.) A revision to Lewis’s analysis of possibility seems
to be required, if one is to maintain his modal metaphysics. Here, I consider a
range of alternative analyses, and argue that they all fail. I conclude that Lewisian
metaphysics is unable to provide an adequate analysis of possibility.
The conclusion is signicant because one of the main justications given for
Lewisian modal realism is precisely that it provides the best analysis of possibility
(Lewis 1986, Sect. 1.2, Sect. 3). But if it is unable to provide any such analysis,
Lewisian modal realism is seriously undermined.
The paper is organized as follows. I outline the commitments of Lewisian
modal realism and introduce the advanced modalizing problem in section 2. In
sections 3–7, I discuss variant analyses of modality which attempt to overcome
the problem without surrendering Lewisian modal realism. I argue that they all
fail. In section 8 I show how the problem also affects stage theory (Sider 1996)
and modal ctionalism (Rosen 1990). Section 9 is a brief conclusion.
2 Lewisian modal realism and advanced modalizing
By ‘Lewisian modal realist’, I mean someone who holds the following theses:
(1) There is a plurality of worlds, all of the same ontological kind
(2) Worlds are maximally spatiotemporally connected, and so distinct worlds
do not have any parts in common
(3) Ordinary individuals are parts of just one world and have their properties
simpliciter, not merely relative to this world or that
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I shall argue that no analysis of modality is available to someone who holds these
theses. My target of course includes Lewis (1968; 1971; 1983b; 1986), but is
wider: one might disagree with Lewis on what causation is or on what properties
or dispositions are, for instance, and yet still count as a Lewisian modal realist.
Lewisian modal realists, having accepted that individuals are worldbound, are
committed to some version of counterpart theory. The standard account analyses a
de dicto statement of possibility such as ‘possibly, there are Fs’ as saying that there
is a possible world at which there are Fs, i.e., a world which has Fs as parts (Lewis
1983b). It analyses a de re possibility statement ‘possibly, a is F’ as saying that
there is a world w and a counterpart a′ of a in w such that, in w, a′ is F. More
generally, if ‘A(a1, . . . , an)’ contains constants (or other unbound terms) ‘a1’, . . . ,
‘an’, then the standard Lewisian account will analyse ‘possibly, A(a1, . . . , an)’ as
follows:
(4) There is a possible world w and counterparts a′1, . . . , a′n of a1, . . . , an
(respectively) in w such that, at w, A(a′1, . . . , a′n)
To complete the account, we need to know how the phrase ‘at w’ works. Lewis
(1968) provides an account in terms of a translation from quantied modal logic
to the extensional language of counterpart theory. On that translation, ‘at w’ has
the effect of recursively restricting all quantiers in its scope to w’s domain. But
Lewis (1986) abandons any such attempt at systematic translation from QML.
For Lewis (1986), ‘at w’ works ‘mainly by restricting the domains of quantiers
in its scope, in much the same way that the restricting modier ‘in Australia’ does’
(Lewis 1986, p. 5). But it need not restrict all such quantiers, just as ‘in Australia’
does not restrict to Australia the ‘any’ in ‘in Australia, there’s some philosopher
cleverer than any other’ (Lewis 1986, p. 5). Since I want my target to include
both Lewis 1968 and Lewis 1986, I won’t assume that ‘at w’ always restricts all
quantiers within its scope. I’ll call the analysis above the Lewisian analysis.
This analysis runs into the advanced modalizing problem (Divers 1999), as
follows. The Lewisian modal realist holds that:
(5) There are many possible worlds
She also accepts the rule of possibility introduction, from ‘A’ infer ‘possibly, A’. For,
given the inter-denability of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessarily’, possibly introduction
is equivalent to the factivity of necessity, from ‘necessarily, A’ infer ‘A’, which she
accepts. (Divers (1999, p. 218) holds that possibility introduction ‘approaches the
status of analyticity’.) So, from (5), the Lewisian modal realist is committed to:
(6) Possibly, there are many possible worlds
She will analyse this as saying
(7) There is a possible world at which there are many possible worlds
that is, there is a possible world which contains as parts many possible worlds.
But she cannot accept (7), for she holds that worlds are spatiotemporally maximal,
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and hence that each possible world has just one possible world, itself, as a part.
So a Lewisian modal realist cannot accept the analysis of modality from above.
(Divers (1999) discusses and rejects some attempts to head off this argument;
see also Divers 2014. I agree with him that the problem is genuine and requires
modication to the analysis of modality.)
In what follows, I will investigate alternative (but still broadly Lewisian)
counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality which the Lewisian can accept and
which overcome the advanced modalizing problem problem from above. I’ll argue
that none can be sustained.
3 The redundancy analysis
Divers (1999) presents a solution to the advanced modalizing problem, as follows.
He claims that, in general, the content of an utterance may be restricted to a single
world, or unrestricted, applying to all of modal space. So, we may understand:
(8) There are no ying hippos
in a restricted way, as saying (truthfully):
(8r) In our world, there are no ying hippos
or we might understand it unrestrictedly, as saying (falsely, by Lewisian modal
realist lights):
(8u) There are no ying hippos anywhere in modal space
For Divers, ‘the semantic function of a possibility operator on a non-modal
quanticational sentence is always that of quantifying in, by way of a variable
that is already reserved for worlds’ (Divers 1999, p. 229). So prexing a content
of the form: in w, A with ‘possibly’ has the effect of changing ‘in w’ to ‘there
is some world w such that, in w’. So, prexing the restricted content (8r) with
‘possibly’ will give us the content:
(9) For some world w, in w, there are ying hippos
which is true by Lewisian modal realist lights. But Divers notes that, in an
unrestricted content such as (8u), there is no phrase ‘at w’ for ‘possibly’ to alter.
So prexing that content with ‘possibly’ will have no effect. As a consequence,
when ‘A’ is read unrestrictedly, ‘possibly, A’ will have the same (unrestricted)
content as ‘A’ itself. The same goes for ‘necessarily’: on unrestricted contents ‘A’,
‘necessarily’ has no semantic effect, so that ‘necessarily A’ and ‘A’ have the same
(unrestricted) content.
Using this analysis, Divers can avoid the problem from above. The Lewisian
modal realist of course intends her utterance of ‘there are many worlds’ to be
unrestricted (since it is false when restricted to any world). But then prexing
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‘possibly’ to that content has no semantic effect, and so (6) has the content: there
are many worlds, and not the content assigned by (7).
Divers’ account has much to recommend it: it is semantically non-ad hoc
(Divers 1999, p. 230) and it ties in well with Lewis’s own remarks about the
semantic effect of ‘possibly’ (Lewis 1986, p. 5). But it cannot be sustained, for
their are (by Divers’ lights) unrestricted contents which (by anyone’s lights) change
their truth-value when prexed by ‘necessarily’. Here is one example.
Consider Anna, who is taller than Bill. As Anna and Bill are perfectly normal
humans, it is a contingent matter that Anna is taller than Bill. Now suppose further
that Anna and Bill are not worldmates of one another, but are nevertheless both
regular human beings very much like you and me. Then
(10) Anna is taller than Bill
should be true, but contingently so. (10) has either a restricted content:
(10r) In the actual world @: Anna is taller than Bill
or it has an unrestricted content:
(10u) (In all modal space:) Anna is taller than Bill
The former is clearly false, for Anna and Bill are not worldmates and hence are
not both parts of any one world. By contrast, (10u) is true, given the genuine
modal realist’s metaphysics. So, appealing to charity, we should disambiguate (10)
to the unrestricted reading (10u). When the genuine modal realist utters (10), we
understand her as asserting (10u). But prexing (10u) with either ‘possibly’ or
‘necessarily’ is redundant, says Divers. So we can thus infer from the unrestricted
content of (10) to:
(11) It is necessary that Anna is taller than Bill
As a consequence, what the genuine modal realist asserts when she utters (10),
namely (10u), is not contingent. But it clearly is a contingent matter that Anna is
taller than Bill. Divers’ analysis gives us the wrong results on this score, and that
is reason enough to reject it.
Divers may claim that (11) is harmless, since (by his lights) it says no more
than (10). But it is not sufcient for Divers merely to nd an acceptable reading
of (11). The data to be explained is the deep intuition that (10) is contingent.
Anna and Bill are regular human beings (albeit spatiotemporally separated ones)
with regular physical human bodies, embedded within physical environments,
and subject to physical laws very much like our own. Then it is certainly true –
perhaps it is even a conceptual truth – that it is a contingent matter who out of
Anna and Bill is taller. But Divers’ redundancy analysis cannot say this, and so
must be rejected. We must consider some other analysis of modality.
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4 The disjunctive analysis
In this section, I consider a broadly Lewisian analysis of modality which takes
its cue from Divers’ redundancy analysis. The idea is to take ‘possibly, A’ to be
true iff it is true either on the Lewisian analysis or on a redundancy reading of
‘possibly’. (My thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.) The
content assigned to ‘possibly, A(a1, . . . , an)’, on this theory, is the disjunction:
(12) Either there is a world w and counterparts a′1, . . . , a′n of a1, . . . , an
respectively in w such that, in w, A(a′1, . . . , a′n); or A(a1, . . . , an)
Call this the disjunctive analysis. One may worry that the approach is semantically
ad hoc (on what basis does a sentential operator result in a disjunctive content?),
but let us set that worry to one side. The main advantage of this approach is that
it overcomes the problems from sections 2 and 3. If we begin with some consistent
‘A’ and infer ‘possibly, A’, this cannot lead to contradiction on the disjunctive
analysis. A disjunction is inconsistent iff all its disjuncts are; but one disjunct of the
resulting analysis of ‘possibly, A’ is ‘A’ itself, which we assumed to be consistent.
A problem is not far away, however. We generate the problem by forcing the
analysis of ‘possibly, A’ to ignore the redundancy disjunct, ‘A’. Take the hunk of
desk-shaped matter on which my laptop is currently sitting; call it ‘Hunk’. Hunk
isn’t a world but (by ordinary modal standards) it could have been: things could
have been such that Hunk exists unaccompanied by anything wholly distinct
from it. Moreover, had Hunk existed unaccompanied, the Sydney Harbour Bridge
would not have been a part of Hunk. It certainly need not have been. So:
(13) Hunk (h) isn’t a world but it could have been a world lacking the Harbour
Bridge (b) as a part
Applying the disjunctive analysis and using ‘W ’ for ‘is a world’, ‘P’ for ‘is a part
of’, and ‘C’ for ‘is a counterpart of’, (13) has the content:
(14) ¬Wh& (∃w∃x∃y(Ww& Pxw&Cxh& Pyw&Cyb&Wx& ¬Pyx)∨(Wh & ¬Pbh))
As ‘Wh’ in the second conjunct’s second disjunct contradicts the rst conjunct
‘¬Wh’, (14) entails
(15) ¬Wh & ∃w∃x∃y(Ww & Pxw & Cxh & Pyw & Cyb &Wx & ¬Pyx)
But, given Lewisian modal realist metaphysics, this is unsatisable. Supposing
that there are entities w, x, and y such that
Ww & Pxw & Cxh & Pyw & Cyb &Wx & ¬Pyx
we infer w = x (since w and x are worlds and x is a part of w) and hence
Pyx & ¬Pyx: contradiction. So (15) as a whole is unsatisable.
We have inferred a contradiction from a truth to which the Lewisian modal
realist is committed, and so the disjunctive analysis is no better off than the
standard Lewisian analysis or the redundancy analysis. Again, we must consider
some other analysis of modality.
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5 The world-free analysis
In this section, I consider a ‘world-free’ analysis of modal language. The idea is to
drop the requirement that the counterparts invoked by an occurrence of ‘possibly’
must be parts of the same world as one another, by dropping quantication
over worlds altogether. (This was suggested to me by Harold Noonan.) ‘Possibly’
then has the semantic effect of existentially quantifying over counterparts; but it
no longer existentially quanties over possible worlds (and so does not restrict
embedded quantiers to any particular world). So ‘possibly, A(c1⋯ cn)’ is analysed
as:
(16) There are counterparts c′1, . . . , c′n of c1, . . . , cn, respectively, such that
A(c′1, . . . , c′n)
Call this theworld-free analysis. This approach avoids the advanced modalizing
problem from section 2. As (6), ‘possibly, there are many possible worlds’ is de
dicto, it will be assigned the unrestricted content there are many worlds, just as on
Divers’ redundancy analysis. More generally, if the Lewisian modal realist accepts
‘A(c1, . . . , cn)’, then inferring ‘possibly, A(c1, . . . , cn)’ cannot be problematic as
a result of the content it is assigned by the world-free analysis. For then, since
each individual is a counterpart of itself, c1, . . . , cn themselves will witness the
existential commitments of that content.
On this analysis, what’s possible is xed entirely by the counterpart relation.
This brings with it a number of advantages over the standard Lewisian analysis. It
allows us to make sense of possibilities involving transworld individuals, abstract
entities, and island universes, for example. It allows that (in an appropriate context)
I could have had spatiotemporally disconnected parts, for example. This seems a
welcome addition of exibility to the analysis of modality, especially given that
there will remain contexts in which ‘I could have been a transworld individual’ is
false.
In analysing whether the world-free analysis is adequate as a theory of
possibility, I want to consider the effect it has on de dicto modality. By ordinary
standards, one can truly assert:
(17) There could have been no penguins
But this is false on the world-free analysis, which treats (17) as having the false
content:
(18) (Unrestrictedly:) there are no penguins
This is rather bad news for the world-free analysis, for there is clearly some sense
in which there might have been no penguins.
The defender of the world-free analysis might counter by analysing (17) as a
de re statement about the actual world, i.e.:
(19) The actual world could have been such that, at it, there are no penguins
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This is true, on the world-free analysis, for the actual world (at least in some
contexts) has counterparts which contain no penguins. The general strategy for
the world-free analysis, therefore, is to treat each de dicto modal claim as a de re
modal claim about the actual world @, with quantiers restricted to @.
This way of treating de dicto claims is problematic. There exists something
that is not part of our world. So by possibility introduction, the Lewisian modal
realist is committed to:
(20) It is possible that there exists something that is not part of our world
But treating this as a de re claim about the actual world, as above, this is analysed
as:
(21) There exists a counterpart w of the actual world such that, at w, something
is not part of w
But this is false. Although we allow (with Lewis 1986) that in general ‘at w’ need
not restrict to w all quantiers within its scope, it must so restrict some of them,
else ‘possibly’ it is not functioning as a modal operator at all (Noonan 1994).
Hence in (21), ‘something’ is restricted to w and so (21) cannot be satised.
The world-free analysis faces an additional problem, which I shall introduce
in section 7 (since it is a problem for the analyses discussed in sections 6–7 as
well). For now, given the issue just raised, I do not think the world-feee analysis is
tenable.
6 The many-worlds analysis
In this section, I consider yet another variant on the Lewisian analysis. One
might locate the problem with the original analysis not in its use of worlds tout
court, but in its restriction to single worlds in the analysandum. Since cases of
advanced modalizing typically focus on situations involving multiple worlds, it is
natural to suspect that these problems can be avoided by relaxing this restriction
in the analysis of possibility statements. We can do this for a statement ‘possibly,
A(a1, . . . , an)’ by allowing the counterparts of a1, . . . , an to be parts of distinct
worlds. (This move was suggested by an anonymous referee for this journal.) On
this approach, ‘possibly, A(a1, . . . , an)’ is treated as:
(22) There are worlds w1, . . . ,wn and counterparts a
′
1, . . . a
′
n of a1, . . . , an,
respectively, such that each ai is a part of wi and, at the plurality w1, . . . ,wn:
A(a′1, . . . , a′n)
Whatever is possible according to Lewis’s original analysis is possible according
to the many-worlds analysis (just take the case in which w1 = ⋯ = wn) but not
vice versa. In particular, the many-worlds analysis provides a consistent reading
of (6); but unlike the world-free approach, it handles such de dicto possibility
statements in a standard way. In this respect, it is an improvement on the views
considered hitherto.
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The problem with the many-worlds analysis is as follows. Consider Anna (a)
and Bill (b) from section 2, who are not spatiotemporally related to one another.
The Lewisian modal realist accepts that there is a mereological sum s of (just)
Anna and Bill: s = a ⊔ b. So, using ‘S’ for ‘are spatiotemporally related to one
another’, we have:
(23) ¬Sab & s = a ⊔ b
So by possibility introduction, we infer:
(24) Possibly, ¬Sab & s = a ⊔ b
The many worlds analysis assigns this the content
∃w1∃w2∃w3∃x1∃x2∃x3(Ww1 & Px1w1 & Cx1a &Ww2 &
Py2w2 & Cx2b &Ww3 & Px3w3 & Cx3s &
at w1,w2,w3 ∶ ¬Sx1x2 & x3 = x1 ⊔ x2) (25)
But this content is incompatible with Lewisian modal realist metaphysics. Since
‘¬Sx1x2 & x3 = x1 ⊔ x2’ contains no quantiers (or quantier-like terms), the
phrase ‘at w1,w2,w3’ is redundant. Since x3 is a part of w3 and x1 and x2 are both
parts of x3, it follows from the transitivity of parthood that both x1 and x2 are
parts of w3. Hence (given the denition of ‘world’) x1 and x2 are spatiotemporally
connected, contradicting ‘¬Sx1x2’.
The many-worlds analysis fails. But there is a closely-related approach which
avoids this problem, which I’ll discuss in the next section.
7 The plurality of worlds analysis
The many-worlds analysis treats a de re possibility statement about a1, . . . , an by
requiring that, for each ai, there is a world wi and a counterpart a′i of a in wi.
This rules out any of the ais having counterparts bigger than any world: hence
the problem from section 6. But we can relax the requirement, saying instead
that, for some plurality of worlds, a1, . . . , an have counterparts somewhere in
that plurality. Thus ‘possibly, A(a1, . . . , an)’ is analysed as:
(26) There are worlds w1, . . . ,wn and counterparts a
′
1, . . . a
′
n of a1, . . . , an,
respectively, such that each ai is a part of the plurality w1, . . . ,wn and,
at the plurality w1, . . . ,wn: A(a′1, . . . , a′n)
This approach seems immune to advanced modalizing problems of the kind
used in section 2. If ‘A(a1, . . . , an)’ is true of some plurality of worlds, then
that plurality of worlds plus a1, . . . , an themselves will witness (26), and so no
contradiction will be derivable. This is, I think, the best analysis of possibility
statements available to the Lewisian modal realist. It overcomes all the problems
faced by the analyses discussed so far; it retains the spirit of Lewis’s original
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proposal; and it allows as possibilities states of affairs which, given Lewisian
metaphysics, it is very natural to think should be possible.
The problem with the plurality of worlds analysis concerns not possibility
but truth simpliciter. Utterances are true, not merely relative to some world or
other, but true simpliciter. These need not be unrestricted utterances such as (5);
everyday (restricted) utterances such as ‘I exist’ and ‘there are no unicorns’ are
true simpliciter. On Lewis’s analysis, ‘A’ is true simpliciter iff it is true relative to
its world of utterance. ‘I exist’ and ‘there are no unicorns’, as uttered by me, are
true simpliciter because they are true relative to my world, the actual world. On
the plurality-of-world analysis (and also the many worlds analysis), however, we
are interested in analysing contents relative to some plurality of worlds. So should
we continue to analyse truth simpliciter as truth relative to a given world, or as
truth relative to a given plurality of worlds? Neither option is very happy.
Suppose we take the conservative option and continue to say that, by denition,
an utterance of ‘A’ is true simpliciter iff it is true relative to the world of
utterance. Then it is analytic that, for restricted contents, truth simpliciter
requires truth relative to some world. So it is also analytic (given how Lewisian
metaphysics denes ‘world’) that truth simpliciter requires truth relative to some
spatiotemporally connected entity. But, given the plurality-of-worlds analysis,
some possible truths are not like this. ‘There are exactly two penguins, and they
are not worldmates’ is false but possibly true, on the plurality of worlds analysis.
The problem is that, on the present approach, it is analytic that it is false simpliciter,
and an analytically false statement cannot possibly be true. So we must reject this
rst option.
We avoid the problem if we allow that ‘A’ is true simpliciter iff it is true relative
to a plurality of worlds, including the world of utterance. But there are many such
pluralities. If we require an utterance ‘A’ to be true relative to all such pluralities
in order for it to be true simpliciter, then very little will be true simpliciter. We
won’t capture the intuitive truth (simpliciter) of ‘there are no unicorns’ (under
its restricted reading), because there are pluralities of worlds which include both
ours and a world of unicorns. If on the other hand we require an utterance ‘A’ to
be true relative only to some such pluralities, in order for it to be true simpliciter,
then we arrive at a contradiction: ‘there are no unicorns’ will come out both true
(simpliciter) and not true (simpliciter). So we must reject this option, too. Note
that the problem applies equally to the world-free and many-worlds analyses.
Bricker’s (2001) solution to the problem is to adopt an absolute notion of
actuality. On this view, some world or plurality of worlds is uniquely actual; all
the other worlds are somehow not ontologically on a par with these. They exist
but are, in a deep metaphysical sense, non-actual. Bricker’s approach resolves the
issue because then truth simpliciter can then be treated as truth relative to the
unique actual world or plurality of worlds. There are a host of problems with for
Bricker’s view. But we can ignore them for present purposes, for the approach is
not compatible with Lewisian modal realism. It is precisely the Lewisian insistence
that each possible world is ontologically on a par which generates the problem;
hence Lewisian modal realists cannot accept the plurality of worlds analysis.
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8 The scope of the problem
So far, I have argued that no analysis of modality is compatible with Lewisian
modal realism. I have done that by considering and rejecting a number of proposals.
Of course, there may be an analysis of modality, compatible with Lewisian modal
realism, which I have not considered here. But there is strong reason to believe that,
even if there is some further analysis to be given, it cannot differ too greatly from
the analyses discussed above. Lewisian modal realism, in accepting non-overlap
of worlds, commits one to a counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality. Given the
need to analyse restricted de dicto contents such as (17), worlds must play a role
at some point of the analysis, where all of those worlds are ontologically on a par.
Given those constraints, it is highly likely that any Lewisian modal realist analysis
of modality will suffer from the problems discussed above.
Before concluding, I want briey to consider whether these arguments also
affect metaphysical theories which are parallel to or parasitic upon Lewisian
modal realism. I’ll consider the stage theory of persistence (Sider 1996) and modal
ctionalism (Rosen 1990). Stage theory (Sider 1996) is four-dimensional in its
ontology: past, present, and future entities exist. It differs from the Lewisian
‘worm view’ of persistence (Lewis 1976), on which an ordinary material object
is a four-dimensional fusion of object-stages, in that stage theory identies the
ordinary objects with the temporal stages. According to the stage view, a person is
a particular temporal stage, rather than a fusion of suitably-related person-stages.
Stage theory deals with temporal statements in much the same way that the
Lewisian analysis deals with modal statements. Lewis’s unity relation I (Lewis
1976) and world-stages are for the stage theorist what the counterpart relation C
and possible worlds are for the Lewisian modal realist. According to stage theory,
‘a was taller than b’ says that there is a past world-stage with parts x and y such
that x is I-related to a, y is I-related to b and x is taller than y. (It does not say
that a past stage I-related to a is taller than a past stage I-related to b, else ‘I
was taller than my father’ would be true, even though I’ve always been shorter
than him.) Given this parallel, an argument can be run against stage theory in just
the way it is run against the Lewisian analysis of possibility, with the ‘at some
time’ operator for ‘possibly’ and the ‘is a world-stage’ in place of ‘is a world’. The
various amendments to the Lewisian approach discussed in sections 3–7 are all
prima facie available to the stage theorist, but all suffer from analogues of the
problems discusses in those sections. (For brevity, I won’t discuss those arguments
here.) So stage theory appears to be as bad off as Lewisian modal realism.
Modal ctionalism (Rosen 1990) does not accept that there is a plurality of
worlds; but it nevertheless uses a ction of modal realism (roughly, The Plurality
of Worlds) to analyse modal statements. It treats ‘A’ as true iff ‘A@’, the Lewisian
analysis of ‘A’ relativised to the actual world @, is true according to the ction of
genuine modal realism, suitably supplemented by an encyclopaedia of all actual,
non-modal truths. Thus, the ctionalist will not assert things like ‘there are ying
hippos at other worlds’, but will assert that, according to the ction, there are
ying hippos at other worlds, and hence that (literally) there could have been
ying hippos.
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The problem with this approach is that the advanced modalizing problem
shows that the ction of modal realism is inconsistent with that analysis of
possibility statements. The modications to the analysis of possibility discussed in
sections 3–7 carry over to the modal ctionalist analysis: ‘A’ will be true iff the
relevant analysis of ‘A’ is true according to the ction of Lewisian modal realism.
But the arguments from sections 3–6 show that the rst four of those analyses are
problematic: in each case, both the analysis of ‘A’ and the negation of the analysis
are true, according to the ction. But if the ction is inconsistent, then everything
is true according to it; and so truth simpliciter, without the ction, trivialises.
I want to consider, briey, whether the modal ctionalist fares better if she
adopts the plurality-of-worlds analysis (section 7) as her way of mapping modal
statements onto her ction. The worry considered in section 7 concerned truth
simpliciter. We cannot take truth simpliciter to be truth relative to the world of
utterance, since some truths concern more than a single world. But neither can we
take truth simpliciter to be truth relative to some plurality of worlds, for there
are many such pluralities and not all will agree on the truth of some ‘A’. Modal
ctionalism seems to offer a way out of this worry. A unique ctional world or
plurality of worlds has a special status, namely, being the world or plurality of
worlds which represents concrete actuality. So there is a distinguished ctional
world or plurality of worlds (just as there is on Bricker’s (2001) solution), even
though the ction is Lewisian. Thus, ‘A’ is true simpliciter iff its plurality-of-worlds
analysis is true in the ction, relative to whichever ctional world or plurality of
worlds corresponds to concrete reality. (For simplicity, call that unique ctional
world or plurality of worlds actual.) So prima facie, the modal ctionalist can
avoid the worry from section 7.
A problem remains, however. Truth (simpliciter) is governed by the T-scheme:
A iff ‘A’ is true (simpliciter). So given the suggested analysis of truth (simpliciter),
(T) A iff the analysis of ‘A’ is true in the ction, relative to the actual world or
plurality of worlds
will be an analytic truth. But what modal status does (T) have? Suppose we
evaluate the right-hand-side of (T) relative to some world of the ction. To do
so, we need to know whether ‘the ction’ and ‘the actual world’ behave rigidly.
Suppose they do not, so that the referent of ‘the ction’ varies across worlds. Then,
we will have a ctional world w whose ction disagrees with w on what is the
case. Then some instance of (T) will be false relative to w and so the ctionalist
must take (T) to be possibly false. But (T) is analytic, and so cannot be possibly
false.
Suppose instead that ‘the ction’ and ‘the actual world’ behave rigidly. Then
whatever is true relative to the actual world or plurality of worlds is necessarily
true relative to the actual world or plurality of worlds. So for some contingent ‘A’,
the right-hand-side of (T) will be true relative to any world of the ction. But since
that ‘A’ is contingent, for some world w of the ction, ‘A’ will be false relative to
w, and so (T) as a whole will be false relative to w. Again, the ctionalist must
take (T) to be possibly false. But (T) is analytic, and so cannot be possibly false.
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So the modal ctionalist cannot make use of the approach from section 7 after all.
In sum, modal ctionalism (if based on Lewisian modal realism) must be rejected.
9 Conclusion
I have argued that Lewisian modal realism cannot give a satisfactory analysis of
modality. If so, the justication for Lewisian modal realism is seriously undermined.
I also argued that parallel arguments equally affect stage theory and modal
ctionalism (as based on Lewisian modal realism).
I dened Lewisian modal realism by its central commitment to (1)–(3).
Surrendering (1) in favour of a plurality of ersatz worlds would avoid the advanced
modalizing problem with which I began (section 2), as well as the problem from
section 5. Surrendering (1) by holding an absolute notion of actuality, as Bricker
(2001) does, would avoid the argument from section 7. Surrendering (2) would
allow a world to contain other worlds, thus avoiding the problems from sections
2 and 5. Rejecting (3), as McDaniel (2004) and Yagisawa (2010) do, may avoid
commitment to counterpart theory at all (since individuals may then be parts of
multiple worlds). But it is not clear that this will resolve the issue, given that the
problems from sections 2 and 5 concern de dicto possibilities. These are precisely
the options that Lewis (1986) argued so forcefully against. So there are options
for modal realists, but none the Lewisian would accept.
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